This article provides empirical evidence on the impact of different interventions by public authorities on interchange fees (IFs) and cross-border multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) on both adoption and usage of payment cards in the EU-27. Controlling for social and financial characteristics across countries, we find no statistically significant effects on payment card adoption. However, we find mixed results on payment card usage after specific regulatory events: (i) IFs regulation and investigations seem to have increased the number of transactions per card, (ii) mandatory reductions in IFs seem to have a negative impact on the value of transactions per card, and (iii) antitrust and regulatory scrutiny related to MIFs is found to increase the number of transactions per card but to reduce the value of transactions per POS. Additionally, the results show that specific regulatory and antitrust investigations related to both IFs and MIFs have statistically significant effects on card transactions as a proportion of all transactions made in a specific country. 
Introduction
During the last decade, payment card markets have been characterized by their rapid growth and widespread usage among consumers and merchants. Transactions which were once exclusively conducted in cash are increasingly made using cards in several countries (Hove, 2004; Deungoue, 2008) . According to the statistics on noncash payments published by European Central Bank (ECB), the number of cards with a payment function in the EU remained relatively stable at 726.7 million compared with 725.2 million in 2009 (European Central Bank, 2011) , this represented around 1.45 payment cards per EU inhabitant. The number of card transactions rose by 6.7% to 33.9 billion, with a total value of 1.8 trillion Euros which corresponds to an average value of around 52 Euros per card transaction (European Central Bank, 2011) . The greater acceptance and use of payment cards suggests that a growing number of consumers and merchants prefer payment cards to paper-based instruments. This makes sense by considering that some studies have suggested that less frequent cash usage would improve social welfare (Garcia-Swartz et al., 2006; Gerdes et al., 2005; Humphrey, 2004; Klee, 2006) . In a similar way, Humphrey et al. (2006) suggest that the complete replacement of paper-based payment instruments by electronic instruments would produce a cost saving of approximately 1% of the total GDP in 12 European countries.
The payment card industry today includes thousands of banks and other financial service providers. As intermediaries, they process payments between millions of merchants and more than a billion cardholders around the globe (Capgemini et al., 4 specificities make received traditional antitrust doctrine largely inappropriate in order to design sound policy interventions (Tirole, 2011) . In addition, competition authorities and bank regulators have questioned the legality, or propriety, of setting IFs as well as whether merchants are being asked to pay too much. Merchants have also complained about these fees. However, the card schemes, and the banks that ultimately receive these IFs, say they are necessary for operating systems that maximize the value to consumers and merchants and for encouraging investment and innovation (Börestam and Schmiedel, 2011; Bradford and Hayashi, 2008; Tirole, 2011) . The ultimate effect of IFs and MIFs regulation and antitrust investigations on the card market are still an open research since ex-post social welfare gains are difficult to determine and is highly sensitive to the specifications of the model employed (Chakravorti and Shah, 2001) .
While the theoretical literature on the economics of payment cards is growing (Humphrey, 2010; Verdier, 2011) , the empirical literature is yet too limited to provide much guidance to public authorities (Bolt and Chakravorti, 2011) . Hence, the lack of empirical studies would explain why competition authorities have been concerned about determining methods to assess the impact of IFs regulations on payment systems. In this way, this paper tries to shed light on the effects of IFs and MIFs regulations on payment systems by considering a detailed compilation of the most important events related to IFs and MIFs (which include both investigations and regulatory scrutiny) during the period 1995-2009. The EU-27 countries are a unique laboratory to undertake the empirical study for two main reasons: (i) their wide heterogeneity across adoption and usage levels of payment cards and the subsequent and considerable development of and have also imposed price caps in certain countries, such as Australia (Chang et al., 2005) . 5 electronic payments during the last years (European Central Bank, 2012) , and (ii) the intense regulatory developments related to IFs occurred during the last years (Börestam and Schmiedel, 2011) . It is worth to point out that our work is closely related to the study by Carbó et al. (2010) (hereafter CCR) . This study estimates the effects of IF regulation on consumer and merchant adoption and usage. There are three key differences with our study. First, while CCR focus on government-encouraged fee reductions in the Spanish payment card market during 1997 to 2007, we adopt a crosscountry perspective which includes all the EU-27 countries. Second, CCR's sample includes transactions of debit cardholders, credit cardholders and average IFs, while our sample only includes aggregate transactions of cardholders (of both credit and debit cards) and we have not information on IFs (since there is no homogenous public information). Third, unlike CCR, this work observes a wide range of regulatory activity in the EU-27. Consequently, we can capture more complex patterns related to the adoption and usage decisions of payment cards which couldn't be adequately captured in their model. Because of these differences in the data and model specification between our study and CCR, we view that these two studies complement each other.
Controlling for social, economic and financial characteristics across countries and years, our main results are as follows. We find no statistical effects of antitrust investigations and regulatory activity of IFs and MIFs on adoption ratios (number of cards per capita and number of POS per merchant). However, we find mixed results on cards' usage ratios after specific regulatory events have taken place: (i) IFs investigations and regulatory scrutiny have a positive impact on the number of card transactions per card, (ii) we find that the value of transactions per card has decreased because of a mandatory reduction in IFs and (iii) the number of transactions per card 6 and the value of transactions per POS are positively and negatively related to antitrust and regulatory scrutiny related to MIFs, respectively. Also, we find that mandatory IF reductions have had a positive and statistically significant effect on both the volume and value of card payments as a percentage of the national payments, while the impact of the MIFs regulation on the value of card payments as a percentage of the national payments was also positive.
Following this introduction, Section 2 offers an overview of the payment literature related to antitrust and regulatory issues about IFs. Section 3 discusses the sample used and introduces a set of empirical models to test whether adoption and usage of payment cards have been affected by specific events (investigations and regulation) related to IFs and MIFs, controlling for cross-country variation in financial, economic and social conditions. Section 4 shows the main results. Finally, Section 5 presents our main conclusions.
The role of IFs in the payment literature
Since Baxter (1983) some studies have considered IFs as necessary incentives to guarantee participation by all parties (buyers, sellers, and their associated payment service providers) in the payment card market. According to Baxter, IFs are used by payment platforms to correct the market failure caused by usage externalities. IFs equilibrium conditions on each side of the market not only allow payment card schemes to operate flexibly, but are also necessary to induce both parties to participate (Baxter, 1983; Rochet and Tirole, 2002) . Frankel and Shampine (2006) list three principal economic arguments offered in support of claims that IFs have important pro-7 competition or efficiency-enhancing economic effects. These are: i) IFs "balance" a "two-sided" payment system market to correct an indirect "network externality" and solve a "chicken and egg" 3 entry barrier problem; ii) IFs solve a "usage externality" in which consumers would not have enough incentives to use cards which are assumed to impose lower costs on merchants; iii) IFs are needed to reimburse card issuers for specific services they provide for the benefit of merchants and their banks (e.g. the interest-free grace period, the "payment guarantee," and "processing").
IFs seem to be essential to the smooth operation of any payment card system. If the IF is too high, merchants will not accept the cards through POS devices, resulting in low usage and consumer adoption. On the other hand, if the IF is too low, consumers may not have sufficient incentives to participate in payment networks. Since low usage volumes and lack of participation may undermine platform viability and thereby deter innovation in the card market, IFs regulation may have a critical impact on platform size, especially when there is competition between platforms (Harper et al., 2006) .
During the last decade have had an intense antitrust activity and regulatory scrutiny, with Australia as an emblematic case of mandated reduction of IFs (Gans and King, 2003; Prager et al., 2009 ). There is a common agreement on why IFs exist but concerns arise with respect to the determination of the socially optimal IF (Börestam and Schmiedel, 2011) and its impact in the whole market.
Today, however, there is little consensus among economists regarding the assessment of current pricing structures and IFs in the industry (Evans, 2011; Evans et 8 al., 2011) . Although some theoretical models claim that IFs are intended to equitably distribute payment system costs, 4 concerns have been expressed that this is not always the case and that fees may be excessive. mention that there is no basis in economics for concluding that the privately set IFs is just right. The challenge to policymakers, on the other hand, is to use the information available to decide whether a network's pricing strategy and rules are likely to encourage or restrict economic efficiency (Hunt, 2003) .
The scope of investigations and regulatory scrutiny related to IFs and MIFs in Europe has not been fully studied until recently (Evans, 2011; Evans et al., 2011 Moreover, it shows that IFs vary considerably across the EU, which may indicate that the market for card payment services is not working efficiently in some member states (European Commission, 2006) . Recent changes and evolution related to IFs have resulted from pressure from regulatory and competition authorities that have investigated payment systems for violations of competition law (Börestam and Schmiedel, 2011; Bradford and Hayashi, 2008; European Commission, 2006; Hayashi and Weiner, 2006) . However, it seems that policy interventions in the payment card 9 industry may render unintended consequences due to their complex environment (Wang, 2010 rather than a particular type of card, we focus our study on the whole payment card market.
Also, and more important, disaggregated data by type of card is not available in many countries in our sample which decrease substantially the number of available observations in our empirical estimations.
12 euros and the average public expenditure on education represents about 5.18% of the GDP. Annex B1 and B2 include a detail description across countries during our sample period.
The empirical models and estimation procedure
In this Section, we develop a set of empirical models to analyse how investigations and regulatory events related to IFs and MIFs have affected adoption, usage and aggregate transactions in the EU-27 payment industry.
Adoption and usage models
Our empirical specification consists of the estimation of two equations that identify adoption and usage ratios, respectively. Consider the following simultaneous regression equations for both consumers and merchants as follows: 
where , cm yyare the dependent variables that represent adoption and usage ratios for consumers and merchants in country i and year t, respectively. In terms of adoption, 10 from consumers towards merchants and merchants towards consumers, respectively. We expect that network effects to keep a positive sign. These variables are particularly relevant since the value of accepting (holding) a card depends on how many consumers (merchants) accept (hold) that card. Also, after consumers decide whether to get a payment card, they must also decide how often they will use it (Özlem and Emilio, 2009; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Shy, 2011) .  is an unobserved countryspecific effect and ,, ,
 are the error terms for the cardholder and merchant equations. 10 We have tried to minimize endogeneity problems affecting simultaneous equations estimations by employing one-year lagged variables as covariates.
Since time-invariant country characteristics (fixed effects) may be correlated with the explanatory variables, by transforming the regressors by first differencing the fixed country-specific effect is removed. In this way, our final empirical specification will be as follows:
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Card transactions as a percentage of all transactions in a country
Structural changes related to IFs and MIFs are assumed to have potential effects in the transactions carried out with payment cards with respect to other available payment instruments. In order to test the effect of investigations and regulatory scrutiny of IFs and MIFs, we also consider the volume and value of payment card transactions as a proportion of the aggregate volume and value of transactions (cash and non-cash based) carried out in a particular country and year. 11 We consider an adapted version of equation (2) as follows:
11 These results could have potential regulatory implications since a recent study showed that, on average, each cash-using household transfers $50 to households that use credit cards and each credit card using household receives a subsidy of $240 every year in the US (Schuh et al., 2010 
GMM simultaneous estimation methodology
As is usual in simultaneous estimations, the error terms in equations (2) and (3) could be potentially correlated. This correlation implies that even if a separate equationby-equation estimation would be consistent, it will not be as efficient a simultaneous equation method. To obtain efficient estimates and address the issue of cross-equation restrictions and endogeneity concerns in simultaneous equations, we estimate equations (2) and (3) jointly using a General Methods of Moments (GMM) routine with fixed effects and time dummies. The GMM estimation is based on the simultaneous estimation of the merchant and consumer equations. It relies on a set of orthogonality conditions which are the products of equations and instruments. The initial conditions for estimation are obtained using three-stage least squares (3SLS), which is a restricted version of the simultaneous equation GMM model. This kind of GMM estimator allows for heteroskedasticity and cross-equation correlation where some variables (in our particular case, the network effects for the adoption and usage equations) may appear as both exogenous and (lagged) endogenous variables in the different equations (Hansen, 1982) . We also cluster standard errors at the country-level and account for crosssectional correlation by using time dummies, as suggested by Petersen (2009) . All variables (except for the regulatory dummy variables) are expressed in logs so that the differences can be interpreted as growth rates.
Endogeneity has been controlled by using up to 3-year lagged values of the full set of explanatory variables as instruments. We run Sargan tests of over identifying restrictions in order to validate the set of instruments under the null hypothesis of correct identifying restrictions. According to the Sargan tests, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in all our empirical models, which suggests that the chosen instruments were appropriately specified (assuming that the model has been correctly specified). Table 3 presents the results of the simultaneous estimation of equation 2. As we expected, we find that network effects play a positive and statistically significant role in fostering adoption in both the consumer and merchant equations. This effect seems to be higher for merchants than cardholders, ranging from 0.167 to 0.179 for cardholders and from 1.4 to 1.55 for merchants.
Main results

Adoption
Regarding IFs, we do not find statistically significant results for any of the considered events. Hence, payment card's adoption seems to have been mostly driven by country-specific variables such as the density of ATMs (as a proxy of the easiness of obtaining cash by customers) along with feedback loop effects. We also find that the number of recorded crimes has a negative impact on the number of cards per capita but we do not find any statistically effect in the merchant side. To some extent, this is due to the fact that the greater number of cards in the consumer's wallet the higher the (monetary and time) costs for users in case of theft. The growth rate of GDP per capita has a positive and statistically significant effect on the adoption of POS devices per merchant in two of our models. However no statistically significant effect is found in the case of cardholders' adoption equation.
Interestingly, growth rates of both the lending interest rate and government expenditure on education have decreased the growth rate of payment card adoption.
Since higher interest rates could reduce consumer's consumption, it seems reasonable to assume a negative relationship of interest rates with the number of cards per capita (which could be linked to higher levels of consumption). Also, the negative impact of the government expenditure on education on adoption reflects the fact that higher levels of education can lead to more cautious decisions about adopting financial instruments.
We also find that the SEPA implementation phase was effective in order to stimulate the consumer side of the market in terms of adoption. However, the negative effect observed on the merchant side could be explained by higher merchant costs due to standardization 12 practices in the payment infrastructure with SEPA. Finally, both EU membership and technological changes (captured by the time trend) keep statistically and significant effects on the adoption's growth rate. In particular, our results suggest a positive effect in the merchant side and a negative effect on the consumer side, respectively.
As a robustness check, we estimate the adoption models taking the dependent variables (number of cards and POS) in terms of square kilometres (see Annex C). The results give support to our previous findings. 
Usage patterns: the volume and value of card transactions
Volume of transactions
Value of transactions
In terms of the value of card transactions ( 
Payment card substitution and IFs
To complement our previous estimations, we study the effect of antitrust and regulatory events related to IF on the percentage of card transactions as a proportion of all transactions (both cash and non-cash based) carried out in a country (Table 6 ). We find that the one year lagged card's extensive margin (value of transactions per card) seems to explain the growth rate of the proportion of the value of card transactions with respect to the country's aggregate value of transactions; however, the size of the effect seems to be economically insignificant.
No statistically significant effect was found in the case of investigations and regulatory scrutiny related to IFs events. Nevertheless, we find a strong positive and statistically significant effect of IFs mandatory reductions on the growth rate of the volume (14%) and value (3.8%) of card transactions as a percentage of the total transactions in a specific country, even after controlling for the influence of the rest of the explanatory variables. Regulatory actions related to MIFs have led to a 0.17% increase in the value of card payments as a percentage of the total transactions in a country. These results are particularly relevant in the cash-substitution literature since the role played by IFs have not been fully considered (Verdier, 2011) .
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As for the control variables, we find that the number of ATMs, GDP per capita and crimes per square kilometre have a positive effect on card transactions with respect other payment instrument's transactions (in terms of volume and value). Interestingly, the lending rate seems to increase the volume of card transactions and reduce the value of card transactions as a percentage of the total transactions in a specific country.
Finally, the SEPA implementation phase had have a positive and statistically significant effect on the value of card transactions with respect to the aggregate value of transactions.
Summary and conclusions
A wide range of antitrust investigations and regulations have affected the development of payment systems during the last years and a lively debate has resulted in whether regulate IFs and MIFs and their potential effects in the payment system.
These concerns are now a critical issue in the debate over the integration of payments and banking in the European Union (European Commission, 2012) . Despite this policy interest, there have been relatively few empirical analyses that explore the potential policy concerns raised in this area.
We study the impact of the main antitrust and regulatory events related to IFs and MIFs on the EU-27 payment card industry. As for the main findings, we find no statistically significant effect of IF regulatory events on the relative adoption ratios for consumers and merchants. It seems that networks effects along with social and 22 economic factors weight more in order to stimulate adoption decisions of payment instruments by both consumers and merchants.
As for usage results, our findings are mixed. We find that IF investigations and regulatory scrutiny activities have affected positively the volume of transaction per card.
By considering mandatory IF reductions, we find a negative effect on the growth rate of the value of transactions per card. Finally, we find evidence of a positive effect of regulatory events related to MIFs on the volume of transactions per card but a negative effect in the growth rate of value of transactions per POS. In a similar way that the adoption equations, both economic and social factors seem play a potential role in order to explain usage of payment cards in Europe.
We also consider the effect on card transactions as a percentage of the aggregate value and volume of transactions (both cash and non-cash based) in a country. We do not find any statistically significant effect of IFs antitrust investigations and regulations.
However, mandatory reductions of IFs have a strong positive and significant effect on both volume and value of card transactions as a percentage of the total transactions per country. We also find that regulatory events related to MIFs have increased the growth rate of the value of card payments as a proportion of the total value of transactions per country.
Finally, it is important to mention two issues which represent the main limitations of our study and that should be considered in future research: (i) the lack of homogeneous data for credit and debit cards across EU-27 countries do not allow us to carry out a differentiated study of the implications of IFs regulation in each of these 23 markets. However, since we are more interested in the global effect for all the market, our results could offer some potential insights for future research in this area and (ii) unfortunately, the lack of public available data on card prices could have generated some bias in our results. The weak identification observed in some of the variables across our empirical specifications and models point out the relevance of more in-depth research in this area and the need of increasing the availability of public information about card prices in order to foster the transparency of the market into the SEPA framework. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: All variables (except for the regulatory dummies) are expressed as difference between the logarithms of current period and the period before so that these differences can be interpreted as growth rates.
Table 4. Usage for cardholders and merchants (volume of transactions)
Simultaneous equations estimation (GMM) with fixed effects (Clustered standard errors by country and z-statistic in parenthesis) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: All variables (except for the regulatory dummies) are expressed as difference between the logarithms of current period and the period before so that these differences can be interpreted as growth rates. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: All variables (except for the regulatory dummies) are expressed as difference between the logarithms of current period and the period before so that these differences can be interpreted as growth rates. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Note: All variables (except for the regulatory dummies) are expressed as difference between the logarithms of current period and the period before so that these differences can be interpreted as growth rates.
Annex A: Chronological list of the main antitrust investigations and regulatory events related to IFs and MIFs in the EU-27
We include a comprehensive list with the key regulatory events related to IFs that token place in Europe during the period 1995-2009. The events are divided in two groups which distinguish between regulation with a national and cross-border scope. Price discrimination between "on-us" and "foreign" transactions were considered to have adverse effects upon issuer competition. Until that date, there had been no supervisory activity of IFs competition in Hungary. Source: Bradford and Hayashi (2008), OECD (2006) and Börestam & Schmiedel (2011 
